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Media Use and Misperceptions
Does TV Viewing Improve our Knowledge  
about Immigration?
Toril Aalberg & Zan Strabac
Abstract
There is considerable evidence that many people generally misperceive the size of the im-
migrant population in their country, and that this may have essential political implications. 
In studies of political knowledge, the news media are typically said to be one important 
source of information that can help make people more knowledgeable. In the present article, 
we investigate whether there is a relationship between TV viewing, media system variations 
and knowledge about immigration. We base our analysis on highly comparable data from 
the 2002-2003 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) and an American replication of 
the ESS. The results indicate that TV viewing in general is associated with lower levels of 
knowledge, while there is a positive but non-significant relationship between watching TV 
news and knowledge about immigration. Differences in the levels of knowledge between the 
countries are fairly large, with residents of Nordic countries being most knowledgeable and 
residents of the UK, US and France tending to be least knowledgeable. Aggregate explana-
tions for variations in media influence (share of public service TV and “media systems”) 
do not prove to be of much value in explaining differences in knowledge about the sizes 
of immigrant populations. 
Keywords: immigration, political knowledge, media exposure, public TV, media systems
Introduction
Immigration has evolved into a major and controversial policy issue in the majority of 
Western countries. Still, there is considerable evidence that the public generally misper-
ceives the size of immigrant and other minority populations. Sides and Citrin (2007) find 
that the uninformed are generally more opposed to both immigration and immigrants. 
Lack of knowledge may therefore have important political implications. 
Typically, people learn about an issue if they have the ability, motivation and op-
portunity to do so (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). While ability is often a question of 
education and motivation is related to personal interest, the opportunity to learn depends 
on the information environment and exposure to news media. The purpose of the present 
article is to investigate whether there is a relationship between TV viewing, media sys-
tem variations and knowledge about immigration. 
Over the past few decades, a rising tide of voices has blamed the news media for 
growing public ignorance of civic affairs. One of the central arguments has been that an 
36
increased market orientation has led to a relentless pursuit of sensational, superficial and 
populist reporting in an attempt to maintain high TV ratings (Fallows 1996). Schudson 
(1995) argues that all this “breathless flimflam” comes at the expense of detailed and 
informed debate about policy issues and hard news. So even if there is more “informa-
tion” available now than ever before, this does not create more informed citizens. 
Most empirical studies, however, have found a positive relationship between indi-
viduals’ exposure to news, viewers’ preference for public service television or quality 
newspapers and their level of political knowledge (e.g., Newton 1999, Norris 2000, 
Holtz-Bacha & Norris 2001, Milner 2002, Prior 2005, de Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005, 
Dalrymple & Scheufele 2007). In other words, there seems to be significant individual 
level differences in political knowledge based on the type of news media people prefer 
or the type of media to which they are exposed. On the aggregate level, however, find-
ings are more inconclusive. Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001: 133), for instance, find no 
systematic media structure pattern that can explain the level of EU knowledge across 16 
countries. Milner (2002: 102), on the other hand, discovers a strong positive relation-
ship between the level of knowledge about the UN and the country’s dependency on 
commercial TV (relative to newspapers). 
In the present study, we investigate if and how TV viewing influences public knowl-
edge about the issue of immigration in 18 countries. Inspired by Hallin and Mancini’s 
book Comparing Media Systems (2004), we also ask whether levels of knowledge vary 
significantly across countries and whether there are systematic differences related to 
the countries’ media systems. The empirical analyses are based on data from the 2002-
2003 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) and an American replication of the 
ESS from 2005.
Compared to earlier studies on media and political knowledge, our study makes three 
main contributions to the current research. First, while a vast majority of previous stud-
ies have been based on data from the US or a handful of European countries, our study 
includes a large number of European countries as well as data from the US. Second, the 
few comparative studies that do exist have primarily focused on knowledge of foreign af-
fairs, such as questions concerning the United Nations or the European Union. Our focus 
is on public knowledge in relation to an issue that is highly relevant and controversial 
for domestic politics across all these countries – the issue of immigration. With this in 
focus, we introduce an indicator that studies of media and political knowledge previously 
have overlooked. It is important to stress that this indicator should not be perceived as 
a proxy for political knowledge in general. We will, however, gain new insight into the 
relationship between media exposure and an additional type of knowledge related to 
domestic politics. Thus, our contribution to current comparative research is to extend 
the type of knowledge measurement used.1 Finally, we control for both individual and 
aggregate level variations in our study. By using a multilevel analysis technique, we 
show how both individual media use and country-specific media features may be related 
to knowledge about immigration. 
Media Use and Political Knowledge 
Several studies have demonstrated that the well-informed citizen is not only more likely 
to be attentive to politics and engaged in various forms of participation (Delli Carpini & 
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Keeter 1996, Ellis 2003, Strømsnes 2003), he/she is also more committed to democratic 
principles and has better-informed opinions (see Bizer et al. 2004 for a review). Thus, 
political knowledge not only aids in the construction of real interest, but it also helps 
assure that such interests will become part of the governing process. 
In order to express attitudes and act in their own self-interest, citizens need relevant 
and up-to-date information about current affairs. This holds regardless of whether one 
considers the competence of individual citizens or the competence of the public as an 
aggregate. In many respects, politically relevant information is more widely available 
now than at any time in history, but what people learn from their media use is highly 
dependent on their media habits. Prior (2005) and Bennet (1998) have shown that those 
who prefer entertainment programmes learn less than those with a preference for news 
broadcasts. This finding also suggests that motivation may be important. Luskin (1990) 
goes as far as to say that motivation and intelligence are the only factors that promote 
political sophistication. Neither education nor media exposure as such make people 
more politically enlightened. 
Most scholars would agree that watching news and current affairs rather than enter-
tainment will have a greater impact on the audience’s political knowledge, or as Pat-
terson (2002) argues: “Watching some news, no matter how bad the content is, is better 
than watching no news at all.” Within the scientific community, however, two divergent 
positions can be seen regarding whether news media (or media in general) may have a 
positive or negative influence on the public. According to the “media malaise argument”, 
modern media – especially TV – tend to create political cynicism and apathy, withdrawal 
from the sphere of public life, social isolation and consequently loss of social capital 
(Robinson 1976, Patterson 1993, Postman 1985, Putnam 1995, Cappella & Jamison 
1997, Ansolabehere et al. 1994, 1995, 1999, Mutz & Reeves 2005). Both the content 
and format of the modern media are seen as causes of this misery. The audience reacts 
by retreating from politics, by losing both their confidence and their interest. According 
to the more optimistic “cognitive mobilization argument”, the modern media (together 
with a higher level of education) contribute to a significant increase in people’s political 
skills, interest and engagement (Inglehart 1970, 1977, 1990, Dalton 1984, 1988, Norris 
1996, 2000). 
The ongoing debate between adherents to the “media malaise” and the “cognitive 
mobilization” camps touches upon a number of questions, and the actual arguments 
presented in the research literature are, of course, much more sophisticated and nuanced 
than this brief presentation suggests. In the present study, the focus is on the question of 
media use and people’s knowledge about an issue that is at the top of political agendas 
in Western countries – immigration. More precisely, we are exploring if and how TV 
viewing influences political knowledge about immigration across different countries 
and media systems. 
A vast majority of the “malaise vs. cognitive mobilization literature” is based on 
studies conducted on the American case. In the commercial US media system, news 
tends to be broadcasted at an early fringe time. Some studies have also demonstrated 
how the American media system gives relatively little attention to public and foreign 
affairs. During the past two decades, “soft news” has grown at the expense of “hard 
news” on American network television (Hamilton 2004: 184). According to one esti-
mate, the time devoted to entertainment, disasters and accidents more than doubled in 
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network television newscasts between 1990 and 1998 at the expense of public affairs 
coverage (Bennet 2003: 14). A central fear expressed by several European commentators 
has been that political information and discussion will be marginalized in a commercial 
system. Traditionally, media systems based on public broadcasting have broadcast news 
at the heart of prime time (Semetko 2000, Hallin & Mancini 2004: 280). Although some 
scholars have identified trends of Americanization of European media systems, “informa-
tion programmes” still account for a substantial proportion of both total and prime-time 
output in much of West-European television (Curran 2002: 192). 
Blumler and Gurevitch (1995: 75) stress that political communication researchers 
have a tendency to implicitly presume that research findings from one society (nor-
mally one’s own) are applicable everywhere. In this case, there are reasons to argue 
that important differences may exist in terms of the amount and quality of information 
provided to the public in different countries. This may influence the various publics’ 
political knowledge (Aalberg 2006, Iyengar et al. 2009, Aalberg et al. 2008, Curran et 
al. 2009). Therefore, the benefits of a comparative research design are not only that we 
can test whether the hypotheses have more universal value, but also that we can check 
for systematic differences across countries. 
If commercial, competitive and TV-dominated media systems provide poor news 
quality, will citizens in these environments be less knowledgeable and have greater mis-
perceptions in relation to important political issues? Some studies already suggest such 
a pattern. Dimock and Popkin (1997) indicate that Europeans are much better informed 
about world events than Americans are, and they suggest that this is due to “substantial 
differences between countries in the communication of knowledge by TV” (1997: 223). 
However, the authors are not able to specify the nature of these differences, nor do they 
seek to explore whether there is a systematic relationship of the kind they suggest. Still, 
some attempts to pursue a comparative empirical analysis of the information environ-
ment and levels of political knowledge have been made by Milner (2002) and Holtz-
Bacha and Norris (2001). Milner (2002: 102) demonstrated that there are systematic 
comparative differences in political knowledge based on a country’s TV dependency 
score (the relationship between the percentage following commercial television and the 
percentage reading newspapers). Milner’s study of 14 countries shows a strong negative 
correlation (r = 0.88) between the level of knowledge about the United Nations and the 
country’s TV dependency score. In the US, which has the highest TV dependency score, 
the public knows very little about the UN. At the other end of the scale we find Norway, 
with the highest level of UN knowledge and the lowest TV dependency score. 
On the individual level, Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001) find a significant positive cor-
relation between self-reported exposure to public television news programmes and levels 
of factual knowledge about the European Union. The authors conclude that their findings 
support pessimistic expectations concerning the consequences of the introduction of 
commercial broadcasting. In most countries, higher levels of knowledge are positively 
and significantly correlated with preferences for public broadcasting, and in particular 
with a preference for public TV combined with regular exposure to the news. They 
do suggest, though, that this is caused by an interactive process rather than by simple, 
unidirectional causation. As opposed to Milner (2002), Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001) 
do not find a systematic pattern that underlies the ranking of the 16 West European 
countries included in their study (2001: 133). Therefore, they stress that future research 
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on political knowledge and media use also needs to include more detailed information 
about the patterns of television broadcasting and the contents of programming. We argue 
that the type of knowledge being studied should also be considered. 
Typically, political knowledge is defined as “the range of factual information about 
politics stored in long-term memory” (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996: 10). Hence, know-
ledge is discerned from issue positions, attitudes and values. Knowledge is neither a 
cognitive process nor merely any belief about or notion of reality: It is a realistic concept 
of reality. However, much of the factual knowledge people are questioned about is often 
irrelevant or trivial in relation to the use of knowledge that is of interest to researchers. 
Knowing the name of the president of the European Commission or the exact number 
of MPs is hardly instrumental when it comes to choosing which party to vote for. An 
important contribution to current research would therefore be to include knowledge 
questions that are more relevant to major political debates over controversial issues – 
knowledge that may have a stronger impact on voters’ policy preferences. 
The Issue of Immigration
In the majority of Western countries, immigration has evolved into a major and con-
troversial policy issue. In Western Europe, immigration from non-Western countries 
is increasingly seen as a problem, and a number of measures have been taken to 
reduce it. These measures include tighter legislation, increased patrolling of borders 
and even barbed-wire fences in enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Additionally, wor-
rying signs of rising xenophobia and increasing support for extreme-right political 
parties have been observed in a number of West-European countries (Norris 2005, 
Pettigrew 1998). In the US, immigration is once again at the centre of “big” politics, 
and a heated debate has emerged that revolves primarily around the issue of illegal 
immigration. The US has also employed tight border controls and barbed-wire fences 
in an attempt to control or reduce immigration, while legislation reform is currently 
a highly contentious issue.
Quite clearly, relatively strong migrational pressures and increasing sizes of immi-
grant populations are among the most important reasons for the political prominence of 
the immigration issue. Public support for restrictive immigration policies and general 
attitudes towards immigration and immigrants are often based on public perceptions of 
immigrant sizes. These perceived sizes do not necessarily correspond to the actual sizes, 
and indeed, there is a fair amount of evidence that the public generally overestimates the 
sizes of immigrant and other minority populations. In the US, immigration is changing 
the racial composition of the country, and Whites are projected to become a numerical 
minority around the year 2050 (National Research Council, 1997).2 However, a study 
by Alba et al. (2005) shows that already by the year 2000 about one half of Americans 
thought that Whites had already become a numerical minority. The same study reports 
gross overestimates of several different minority groups in the US, often amounting to 
“fairly extreme distortions of national demography” (Alba et al. 2005: 911). Similar 
results showing strong overestimates of minority populations in the US have been 
presented by several additional studies (Gallagher 2003, Nadeau et al. 1993, Nadeau & 
Niemi, 1995, Sigelman & Niemi, 2001). In Europe, fewer relevant studies have been 
conducted, but the existing results generally show strongly inflated estimates of minority 
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population sizes. Using the same ESS data as we do, Sides and Citrin (2007) find that 
the respondents overestimated the sizes of immigrant populations in all 20 European 
countries included in their study. The authors report that: “Respondents in every coun-
try overestimated the percentage of immigrants in their country, often by a substantial 
amount” (Sides & Citrin, 2007: 487). A study of German respondents conducted by Se-
myonov et al. (2004) showed similar results: Germans perceived the size of the foreign 
population in their country to be almost twice its actual size. 
These widespread size misperceptions have important consequences. Alba et al. 
(2005) find that their white American respondents who have distorted perceptions of 
the size of minority populations tend to have particularly negative attitudes towards 
immigrants, Blacks and Hispanics. In Europe, similar results have been obtained. Sides 
and Citrin (2007) find that European respondents who overestimate the number of 
immigrants are more opposed to both immigration and immigrants, and Semyonov et 
al. (2004) find that overestimates of immigrant population size lead to more negative 
attitudes towards immigrants in Germany. In several European countries, the negative 
attitudes towards immigrants that are (partly) a result of lack of knowledge about the 
number of immigrants also contribute to increased support for extreme, right-wing 
political parties. Norris (2005) finds that individuals with negative attitudes towards 
immigrants and immigration are more likely to vote for extreme, right-wing parties, and 
that this result holds even after controlling for a large number of additional variables 
(Norris 2005: 182-184).
Some of the authors blame the educational system for the problems associated with 
the observed low levels of knowledge. Thus Alba et al. (2005) conclude that their find-
ings “…highlight the frequently overlooked value of an old bromide against prejudice: 
education.” (Alba et al. 2005: 901). While this is certainly correct, it can also be argued 
that much of the information about immigration that individuals possess is acquired 
through the mass media. Therefore, more studies of media influence are needed, and in 
the present article we are trying to address this need.
Hypotheses
Based on our review of previous literature, we have arrived at five hypotheses as to what 
to expect from the empirical analysis. Three of the hypotheses are related to the aggre-
gate level (H1, H2 and H5) and two are related to the individual level (H3 and H4). 
H1. Countries with a high proportion of public service television will have higher 
le vels of knowledge about immigration than countries with a low share of public 
service television.
H2. Countries with a democratic corporatist media system will have higher levels of 
knowledge than countries with a liberal or polarized pluralist media system. Know-
ledge about immigration will be lowest in liberal countries due to their low level of 
public service television. 
H3. Citizens who watch a great deal of television news will have higher levels of 
knowledge about immigration than citizens who do not watch a great deal of news on 
television. 
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H4. Citizens who watch a great deal of television in general will have a lower level 
of knowledge about immigration than citizens who do not watch a great deal of 
television in general. 
H5. The relationship between citizens’ exposure to television news and knowledge 
about immigration will be stronger in countries with higher shares of public service 
television. 
Data and Methods
The main sources of data for our study are the 2002-2003 wave of the European Social 
Survey (ESS), and the US “Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy” (CID) survey that 
was conducted by the Center for Democracy and Civil Society (CDACS) at Georgetown 
University in 2005 (Howard et al. 2005). The CID survey replicates large parts of the 
ESS survey and the merged CID-ESS file provided by CDACS was used in the present 
analyses.3 In addition, we used OECD data on the sizes of immigrant populations in the 
countries included in the study. We focus on Western countries in our analyses, and our 
sample consists of 17 European countries and the US. The data are weighted in such 
a way that each country has an equal number of respondents. The equal size weight is 
combined with the design weight, which corrects for the inequalities in selection prob-
ability caused by the sampling design.
The American partial replication of the ESS we use does not contain measures of 
newspaper and radio consumption that are available for European countries. Thus, in the 
present study, we are restricted to only examining the relationship with TV consumption. 
We chose this type of study instead of a more thorough study of European countries for 
mainly two reasons. First, television is generally considered to be the most powerful 
medium. Second, truly comparative data sets containing both European countries and 
the US are much rarer than data sets including European countries only (e.g., Euroba-
rometer, ESS in its original form, etc.). For this reason, there is perhaps a greater need 
for studies including both Europe and the US.
For practical reasons, we do not include media content data in our analysis. Although 
some previous studies on the relationship between media and political knowledge have 
included assessment of differences in media content, these have typically been limited 
to single-country studies. Important exceptions are studies on EU knowledge that have 
relied on content data from Monitoring Euromedia. This is a study of media coverage 
in the European Union primarily about EU issues in newspapers, but television media 
content is also included for six of the member states. Although this source provides the 
most comprehensive cross-national content analysis data set currently available, it is not 
suitable for our project. As the aim of our study is to compare media system difference 
and difference in knowledge about immigration, we would argue that detailed media 
content data are not vital for our analysis. 
Individual-level Variables
The dependent variable in our analyses is a continuous measure of how inaccurate a 
respondent’s knowledge of the size of the immigrant population in his/her country is. 
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The variable, called Size misperception, is calculated as the absolute value of the differ-
ence between the real size of the country’s immigrant population and the individual’s 
perception of this population’s size. More precisely, the value of the Size misperception 
variable for an individual i from a country j is calculated as follows:
Size misperceptionij = | Real sizej - Perceived sizei |  (1)
The size misperceptions are expressed in percentage points. For example, the value 10 
means that the individual has evaluated the size of the immigrant population in her/his 
country to be 10 percentage points larger or smaller than it actually is. The measure of 
real sizes of immigrant populations (country-level variable Real size) was constructed 
on the basis of data from OECD (2005) and OECD (2007) and measures the percentage 
of the country’s population that is made up of foreign-born individuals.4 The measure 
of a respondent’s perception of the size of immigrant population in his/her country 
(individual-level variable Perceived size) is constructed on the basis of this question 
from the survey: “Out of every 100 people living in [country], how many do you think 
were born outside [country]?”. Thus, the values of the measure express respondents’ 
estimates of the percentage of foreign-born in their country.5
Respondents’ TV viewing is captured by two variables. The first variable, TV total, 
measures the total time respondents spend watching television daily. The variable is 
measured on a five-point scale (1 – “No time at all” to 5 – “More than 3 hours”) and 
is based on the following question from the survey: “On an average weekday, how 
much time, in total, do you spend watching television?” The second variable, TV news, 
measures the time respondents spend watching news or programmes about politics and 
current affairs. The variable is measured on an eight-point scale (1 – “No time at all” to 
8 – “More than 3 hours”), and is based on the following question from the survey: “...
on an average weekday, how much of your time watching television is spent watching 
news or programmes about politics and current affairs?”
A number of control variables are also included in the models. The variable Female is 
a dummy variable coded “1” for females. The variable Education measures the respond-
ent’s level of education on a 7-point scale, while Age measures the age of the respondent 
(in years).6 In addition to these “classical” sociodemographic control variables, we also 
include variables known to specifically influence estimates of size of the minority popula-
tion. As Alba et al. (2005) point out, it is reasonable to expect the size estimates to vary 
according to the degree of everyday exposure to minorities and immigrants, such that 
individuals who have more exposure to immigrants report higher estimates of the number 
of immigrants. For this reason, we also include controls for size of the place of residence 
(knowing that immigrants tend to be more concentrated in big cities) and nativity (as im-
migrants tend to have more contact with other immigrants). The size of place of residence 
is operationalized as the variable Urbanity, with values of the variable varying from 1 – “a 
farm or home in the countryside” to 5 – “a big city”. Nativity is operationalized as the 
dummy variable Immigrant, coded “1” for foreign-born respondents.7
Country-level Variables
We implement the tripartite media systems classification of Hallin and Mancini (2004: 
67) by creating dummy variables for the North Atlantic or Liberal and the Mediterranean 
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or Polarized Pluralist models, and using the North/Central European or Democratic 
Corporatist model as a reference category. The following countries are classified as 
belonging to the Liberal model: the UK, Ireland and the US. Spain, France, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal are classified as belonging to Polarized Pluralist model. Finally, 
Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Norway and Sweden are classified as belonging to the reference category – Democratic 
Corporatist model. 
The variable Public TV share measures the share of public service television in the 
countries in our study. The variable is coded based on data from Djankov et al. (2003) 
and measures the share of public ownership of the five largest TV stations in a given 
country as of December 1999. To check for consistency of the data in relation to other 
ways of measuring the share of public service TV, we compared our data with the data 
from Norris (2000: 95-96), which measure the audience share of public TV channels in 
1997. The two measures are very similar, and the correlation between them is 0.82. 
We also code a country-level variable measuring the percentage of respondents in a 
country that have “correct” or “accurate” perceptions of the size of the immigrant popu-
lation in their country. We define an individual’s size perception to be correct if it is less 
than five per cent larger or smaller than the real value of the immigrant population size 
in her/his country. The variable is named Percentage correct perceptions. 
Results
The real sizes of foreign-born populations, as well as the average values of the perceived 
sizes and the size misperceptions in the countries in our analyses are presented in Table 
1. The countries in the table are ordered by values of the misperceptions. These vary 
from about 5 percentage points in Finland to about 18-19 percentage points in the US 
and France. The general impression is that citizens of Nordic countries tend to have 
quite accurate perceptions of immigrant size, while the French, Americans and Britons 
have particularly incorrect perceptions. To a certain degree, this is influenced by our 
operationalization of misperceptions as values of perceived size that are either lower or 
higher than the real size. Obviously, in countries like Finland or Denmark, which have 
few immigrants, it is difficult to underestimate the immigrant population size. Thus, 
the misperceptions are almost exclusively overestimates. However, if we focus only on 
overestimates (an approach that favours countries with large immigrant populations), 
we get very similar results. The largest overestimates are made in France, the UK and 
the US, while the smallest are from Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Norway.8
If we look at the Percentage with correct perceptions measure in Table 1, a similar 
pattern emerges. The proportion of the population with accurate perceptions of im-
migrant population size vary from about 74 per cent in Finland to about 21 per cent in 
the US. Note that the differences between the countries are very large: While almost 
three quarters of Finns are knowledgeable about immigrant population size, this can 
be said of only one in five Americans. The reasons for these differences in knowledge 
about immigrant population size are probably complex, and may include differences in 
educational composition, prominence of immigration issues in the public debate and so 
forth. However, we are primarily interested in the influence of media systems, and we 
may speculate on whether the differing shares of public TV in the countries in our sam-
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Table 1. Real and Perceived Sizes of Foreign-born Populations, the Size of the Misper-
ceptions and Percentage with Correct Perceptions (percentage points)
    Percentage with 
 Real size Perceived size Misperceptions  correct perceptions
Finland  2.54 6.73 5.16 73.98
Denmark 6.73 10.14 6.46 68.53
Norway 7.33 12.18 8.43 52.55
Ireland 10.38 14.6 9.82 33.01
Germany  11.12 19.88 11.5 37.66
Austria 12.48 20.26 11.57 35.35
Spain 5.32 16.23 11.65 50.05
Greece  10.27 20.12 11.88 36.06
Sweden  12.01 20.29 12.19 33.6
Switzerland 21.55 28.06 12.59 31.46
Italia 3.93 17.57 14.31 33.6
Belgium  10.68 23.11 15.02 32.4
Netherlands 10.1 23.53 15.27 30.22
Luxemburg 32.45 40.58 15.35 22.2
Portugal  6.29 20.78 15.42 42.34
United Kingdom 8.28 23.86 17.69 28.16
USA  12.8 28.22 18.38 21.4
France  10.03 27.78 19.1 25.12
Note: The Perceived size is a country’s average value of respondents’ perceptions of the size of the immigrant 
population. The Misperceptions measure is calculated as a country’s average value of: abs (Perceived size – Real 
size). Percentage with correct perceptions shows the proportion of respondents whose size perceptions diverge 
less than +\- 5% from the real size.
ple can explain some of the observed knowledge differences. For a simple check of this 
possibility, we use a scatter plot with a regression line that is presented in Figure 1.
At first glance, there seems to be some influence of the share of public TV on know-
ledge. The slope of the regression line is in the expected direction: a larger share of 
public service TV tends to be associated with a higher degree of knowledge. However, 
we can also see that the value of the regression coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero (p-value = 0.23), that only about ten per cent of the variance in knowledge is 
explained, and that the positive slope of the regression line is heavily influenced by the 
outlying values for Finland and Denmark. Thus, our conclusion here is that we do not 
find any clear association between the share of public TV and knowledge. As we shall 
see, a more sophisticated analysis presented later on produces the same result.
Let us now proceed with the more sophisticated, multilevel analyses of individual-
level and country-level determinants of knowledge. In all further analyses, we will use 
Misperceptions as the dependent variable.
We begin by estimating the intercept-only model, defined by:
Yij = β0j + u0j + eij  (2)
where the dependent variable is Misperceptions, beta is the intercept, e is level-1 residual 
and u is level-2 residual. The subscript i varies across the level-1 units (respondents) 
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and subscript j varies across level-2 units (countries). After estimation of the model we 
calculate the Variance Partition Coefficient9 (VPC) using equation (3):
VPC =  (3)
where Var(e) is the variance of level-1 residuals (variance at the individual-level), and 
Var(u0) is the variance of the level-2 residuals (variance at the country-level). In our 
model, the variance of the level-1 residuals equals 193.81, while corresponding value 
for level-2 residuals is 14.06. The VPC thus equals 0.138. This means that around 6.8 
per cent of the total variance in knowledge about immigrants can be attributed to dif-
ferences between level-2 units (countries). Both the t-test and the likelihood ratio test 
show that the coefficient for the variance of the level-2 residual is highly significant, 
and we therefore conclude that multilevel analysis is necessary.10 
We now include our independent variables into the multilevel models presented in 
Table 2. We build the models gradually. First, only the two measures of TV viewing are 
included (Model 1), thereafter all level-1 controls and Share of public TV variable are 
added (Model 2). Finally, the cross-level interaction between Share of public TV and 
TV News is included into Model 3 in order to test Hypothesis 5. 
Before interpreting the results, we should recollect that our dependant variable 
measures lack of knowledge. Therefore, the negative effects of an independent variable 
indicate an increase in knowledge with increasing values of the independent variable, 
and vice versa. As one can see, the effects of the measures of TV viewing in Model 1 
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Figure 1. Share of Public Service TV and Percentage Correct Answer. Scatterplot with 
the regression line
Share of public TV
Note: Correct perceptions are defined as perceptions that diverge less than +/- 5% from the actual size of the 
immigrant population in the country. 
R² = 0.09; p-value for the regr. coeff. = 0.227
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Table 2. Regression of the Misperceptions of the Percentage of Foreign-born on Indi-
vidual- and Country-level Regressors (Two-level model estimated by SPSS)
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept 9.69 *** 0.90 15.544 *** 1.787 15.748 *** 1.745
Level-1 variables         
TV total 1.43 *** 0.09 0.800 *** 0.091 0.798 *** 0.091
TV news -0.58 *** 0.07 -0.138  0.071 -0.200  0.134
Female    3.498 *** 0.162 3.495 *** 0.162
Education    -1.569 *** 0.059 -1.570 *** 0.059
Age    -0.055 *** 0.005 -0.055 *** 0.005
Urbanity    0.607 *** 0.071 0.605 *** 0.071
Immigrant    2.613 *** 0.289 2.608 *** 0.289
Level-2 variables         
Share of public TV    -0.037  0.032 -0.041  0.031
Sh. of public TV*TVnews       0.002  0.003
Deviance (-2LL) 229373.91 224009.02 224007.49
Note: *Significant at 0.05 level; **Significant at 0.01 level; ***Significant at 0.001 level. Only fixed parts of 
the models are presented.
are in accordance with the findings of previous studies. TV viewing in general has a 
negative influence on knowledge, while watching news and programmes about politics 
and current affairs increases knowledge. However, if we control for other relevant 
predictors of knowledge as we did in Model 2, we see that the relationship between 
exposure to TV news and knowledge about immigration is no longer significant.11 
Thus, our results clearly support Hypothesis 4 (TV viewing in general is associated 
with lower knowledge), but we do not find strong support for Hypothesis 3. Although 
the relationship is in the expected direction, the weak and non-significant coefficient 
indicates that citizens who watch a large amount of TV news do not necessarily learn 
much more about immigration. 
Regarding the influence of the share of public TV on knowledge, we can see that the 
sign of the coefficient in Model 2 is negative, as expected. However, the coefficient is 
not significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. Our conclusion is 
that we did not find strong enough support for Hypothesis 1. Therefore, we cannot say 
that countries with a high proportion of public service television generally have higher 
levels of knowledge about immigration. It is important to emphasize that our results 
concern one particular measure of knowledge in 18 countries. They do not prove that 
other indicators of political knowledge will also be unrelated to the share of publicly 
owned TV channels.
In Model 3, we have included the cross-level interaction between Share of public TV 
and TV news variables in order to conduct an appropriate statistical test of Hypothesis 5, 
which predicts a stronger covariance with news watching in countries with a large share 
of public service TV. As we can see, the coefficient of the interaction term is very close 
to zero, and clearly not statistically significant. The chi-square test also fails to show any 
significant improvement in the model after introduction of the interaction term.12 We also 
ran Models 2 and 3 with the measure of share of public TV based on the audience share 
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data from Norris (2000). The results remained basically the same, with a negative non-
significant coefficient of “public TV share” in Model 2, and a positive non-significant 
interaction term in Model 3. A more detailed, although somewhat simplified, view of 
the differences in effects of news watching can be obtained from Figure 2.
Again, our first impression from looking at Figure 2 is that a larger share of public TV 
in a country leads to a more positive relationship between news-watching and knowledge 
due to the negative slope of the regression line. However, the value of the regression 
coefficient is very low and not statistically significant. Based on these results and the 
results from Model 3, we can clearly conclude that the relationship between news watch-
ing and knowledge about immigration is not generally stronger in countries with higher 
shares of public TV ownership. Thus, Hypothesis 5 has to be rejected.
Hypothesis 2 states that we expect citizens of countries with a democratic corporatist 
system to have higher levels of knowledge than citizens of countries with a liberal or 
polarized pluralist media system. In order to test this hypothesis, we replace the Share 
of public TV variable in Model 2 with two dummy variables, one representing coun-
tries with a liberal media system, and another representing countries with the polarized 
pluralist system. The effects of level-1 predictors are roughly the same as in Model 2, 
and we will not present them once again. Regarding the two level-2 dummies, the coef-
ficient of North Atlantic or Liberal system measures equals 3.27 (p-value = 0.14), while 
the coefficient for Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist system measures equals 1.75 
(p-value = 0.35). As we can see, the model predicts higher misperceptions in countries 
with liberal and polarized pluralist media systems as compared with countries with a 
democratic corporatist system (reference category). However, none of the coefficients 
is statistically significant and our conclusion is that we have to reject Hypothesis 2.
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Figure 2. Effects of News Watching on Misperceptions (absolute). Controlled all level-1 
predictors Included in Table 2.
Note: Value or regr. coeff. = -.004; p-value=.210; R square=.096
FI
GR
PT
BE
FR
ES
SE
NO
NL
GB
DE
IT
IE
AT
DK CH
US
LU
48
Discussion
The purpose of the present study has been to investigate if and how TV viewing may 
influence public knowledge about the issue of immigration in 18 countries. We have also 
asked whether the level of knowledge and media effects vary systematically according 
to the countries’ media systems. 
While simple analyses seem to support many of our hypotheses, more stringent tests 
reveal that there is no clear relationship between the level of knowledge about im-
migration and our aggregate measures of media structure. Using a multilevel analysis 
technique, we found no evidence of a strong relationship between a country’s share of 
public service television and public knowledge on immigration. Similarly, the covari-
ance between knowledge about immigration and exposure to news and current affairs 
was not significantly higher in countries with a high share of public TV. 
At first glance, the analysis also suggests that citizens living in countries classified 
as having a democratic corporatist media system tended to be more knowledgeable than 
those exposed to either a liberal media system or a polarized pluralist system. But after 
more thorough tests, the coefficients are no longer significant. As we have seen, there 
are large differences between the countries regarding levels of knowledge about im-
migration; the percentage of respondents with roughly correct perceptions varies from 
about 70 per cent in Finland and Denmark to only slightly more that 20 per cent in the 
US, Luxemburg and France. However, these differences do not seem to have much to do 
with the countries’ media systems, as defined by Hallin and Manchini (2004), or with the 
share of public TV in the country. Data from the European Election Studies do indicate 
that there is some between-country variation in how important immigration issues are 
considered to be. If media coverage of these issues is more intense in countries where 
the public considers them to be more salient, this could result in knowledge differences 
that are not related to media systems.13
At the level of the individual, the positive relationship between exposure to news and 
current affairs and knowledge about immigration is no longer significant after control-
ling for other relevant factors. The negative covariance between watching TV in general, 
however, remained relatively strong and highly significant. How can we interpret this? 
The fact that the negative relationship between knowledge about immigration and 
time spent watching television in general remained strong even after more stringent tests 
can be interpreted in two ways, depending on the assumed direction of causality. This 
could be the result of a negative media effect that causes large-scale consumers of TV in 
general to overestimate the number of immigrants in the country. Alternatively, causal-
ity may be working in the reverse direction. We cannot rule out the possibility that the 
politically ignorant choose to spend more of their time watching television in general. 
From a normative point of view, however, we should perhaps be more concerned 
about the very weak and non-significant effect of news and current affairs exposure on 
knowledge about immigration. After all, the main purpose of news and current affairs 
is to keep citizens informed about what is going on in society and politics. Others have 
previously demonstrated such a positive effect (e.g., Newton 1999, Norris 2000, Milner 
2002), but could this have been based on their limited sample, their simple analyses or 
the knowledge questions used? Different approaches may produce different results.
We believe at least two additional explanations may clarify why we found no clear 
relationship between exposure to news and current affairs and knowledge about immi-
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gration. One is related to Luskin’s (1990) argument that motivation and intelligence are 
the only factors that promote political sophistication. If people are not interested in the 
issue, neither education nor media exposure as such will make them more knowledge-
able. In our analysis, the effect of TV news exposure was significantly reduced after 
controlling for variables that can typically be related to a special interest in the issue 
of immigration. 
Another explanation is related to the actual content of the news to which respond-
ents had been exposed. For practical reasons, our analysis did not include data on news 
content. Perhaps the issue of immigration and the share of immigrant populations were 
rarely discussed in the news reports prior to the completion of the opinion surveys. 
The relationship between news media exposure and knowledge about immigration may 
also be influenced by the way the media frame this issue. Some studies have suggested 
that news coverage on immigration is particularly biased. Roggeband and Vliegenthart 
(2007) found that the Dutch news media presented a much more hegemonic framing 
of immigration issues compared to the diversity of framings used in the parliamentary 
debates. Moreover, another study reveals that increasing the number of news reports 
about immigration-related topics typically led to higher support for anti-immigrant 
parties (Boomparden & Vliegenthart 2007). Future research should therefore take a 
closer look at the quantity and quality of information provided by the news media on a 
number of issues as well as at the relationship between exposure to these news media 
and citizens’ political knowledge. 
Notes
 1. Future comparative studies should seek to include a larger variety of political knowledge items, including 
both different foreign and domestic policy dimensions. 
 2. The accuracy of such long-term projections is highly questionable, but they provide a vivid illustration of 
the changes in ethnic composition. 
 3. The data were downloaded from: http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs//cid/data.htm .
 4. The values of the Real size variable are presented in Table 1.
 5. The respondents are asked to estimate the size of the population of so-called “first generation” immigrants. 
In some countries, the most commonly reported definitions of immigrant populations also include 
individuals with one or two immigrant parents (so-called “second generation”). This may lead to the 
lower accuracy of the estimates of individuals who live in countries in which the second generation is 
included in the definitions. However, the differences that arise in this case seem to be relatively modest. 
For instance, the most common definition of immigrant population in Norway includes individuals born 
in the country that have two foreign-born parents. According to this definition, 9.7% of the population 
are immigrants at the time of writing. If one uses only the first generation, the immigrant population 
is only slightly smaller, numbering 8% of the total (Statistics Norway, 2009). Even in countries like 
Belgium, which have an “older” immigrant population and therefore a larger second generation, the 
different ways of including the second generation result in about four percentage points difference in 
estimates of immigrant population (Council of Europe 2003).
 6. There were minor differences in measurement of educational level in the US (8 point scale) and the Euro-
pean countries (7 point scale). We have rescaled the American variable to the 7 point scale by collapsing 
values 3 (“High school grade”) and 4 (“GED”) into a single category. 
 7. Respondent income is also usually included as a control variable (e.g., Holtz-Bacha & Norris, 2001). 
However, there is a large proportion of missing values on income for some of the countries, with a 
maximum percentage of 42 per cent in Spain. For this reason, we do not include income in the final 
models. Preliminary tests in the countries with low missing values on income show that the results of 
the analyses remain essentially the same after additionally controlling for income.
 8. The overestimates are simply the difference between the real and the perceived sizes in any given country 
(the first two columns in Table 1). Note that the average values of the perceived sizes are larger than the 
real sizes in all of the countries. Thus, the respondents tend to perceive foreign-born populations to be 
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bigger than they really are in all of the countries. More details about the differences between real and 
perceived sizes of immigrant populations in the countries included in the ESS can be found in Sides 
and Citrin (2007) and Strabac (2007). The analysis of Strabac (2007) shows that these differences are 
statistically significant in all of the Western European countries. 
 9. In a two-level model, the VPC is identical to the more commonly used term Intra-Class Correlation (ICC). 
However, as Goldstein (2003: 17) points out, use of the term ICC in the discussion of the variance parti-
tion may be confusing, and the clearly defined term VPC is more appropriate. 
 10. In models with a low number of level-2 units such as ours, testing the significance of variance components 
by using estimated standard errors and z- or t-tests is somewhat problematic, because the sampling 
distribution of the variance estimates is skewed to an unknown degree (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002: 55). 
Rasbash et al. (2003) recommend use of the likelihood ratio test as a preferred test. We will thus perform 
the latter test when discussing both the goodness of fit of the models and the significance of the variance 
components.
 11. The TV news coefficient is actually close to the conventional 0.05 level of significance (p-value=0.051), 
but in a large sample such as ours this is far from impressive.
 12. The difference in the degrees of freedom between Models 2 and 3 actually equals three. This is because 
two additional coefficients in the random part of the models (not shown in Table 2) are estimated in 
Model 3.
 13. Assuming roughly equal quality of the news coverage.
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